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Grounding Suicide Terrorism in Death
Anxiety and Consumer Capitalism
JAMES M. DONOVAN*
Perhaps the whole root of our trouble, the human trouble, is that
we will sacrifice all the beauty of our lives, will imprison ourselves in totems, taboos, crosses, blood sacrifices, steeples,
mosques, races, armies, flags, nations, in order to deny the fact
of death, which is the only fact we have.1
I. INTRODUCTION
Thomas Huxley is known to history as “Darwin’s Bulldog” for his
forceful advocacy of Charles Darwin’s theory of evolution.2 As part of
that debate, he is claimed to have once remarked that “we must learn what
is true in order to do what is right.”3 Whether speaking about physical or
social processes, our understanding is enhanced when we know how the
pieces fit together.
Suicide terrorism is one topic about which we would like to do the
right thing. For most, that would include finding a way to prevent suicide
terrorist attacks. To the extent that prevention depends on removing the
motivations that exist for those who engage in the activity, it can be difficult to learn what actually drives individuals to engage in suicide terrorism, particularly because the perpetrators are inevitably unavailable to
tell us their reasons. As a result, decision-makers often fall back on
* James M. Donovan (J.D. Loyola New Orleans 2003; Ph.D. Tulane University 1994; B.A. University of Tennessee at Chattanooga 1981) is Director and James and Mary Lassiter Associate Professor of Law at the University of Kentucky’s J. David Rosenberg College of Law. A previous draft
of this paper benefited from roundtable discussion at the Secção de Sociologia do Direito e da
Justiça da Associação Portuguesa de Sociologia [Annual Meeting of the Research Committee on
Sociology of Law] [RCSL/SDJ] that took place in Lisbon, Portugal from September 12-13, 2018.
1. JAMES BALDWIN, THE FIRE NEXT TIME 91 (Michael Joseph Ltd. 5th ed. 1968) (1963).
2. But see John van Wyhe, Why There Was No ‘Darwin’s Bulldog’: Thomas Henry Huxley’s
Famous Nickname, 35 LINNEAN 26 (2019), https://www.ca1-tls.edcdn.com/Linnean_Vol-35_1_
April-2019_Web.pdf?mtime=20190624175025.5.
3. CHARLES J. LUMSDEN & EDWARD O. WILSON, PROMETHEAN FIRE: REFLECTIONS ON
THE ORIGIN OF MIND vi (Harvard Univ. Press ed. 1983).
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assumptions and stereotypes that serve other purposes, but which rarely
lead to useful or truthful insights on the problem.
This article examines an influential theory on suicide attacker motivations, the Significance Quest Theory, and suggests that this death anxiety approach can be improved by shifting its focus toward the related,
but more comprehensive, Terror Management Theory. The theoretical
productivity of this realignment is tested by examining the relationship
between suicide attacks and one of the variables thought to trigger the
underlying anxieties: the local pressures from global consumer capitalism. After describing the relationship between death anxiety and suicide
terrorism generally, this article concludes by applying these insights to
the ethnographic context of Egypt.
II. WHAT WE MEAN BY “TERRORISM”
The first step toward finding what is true regarding any subject is to
identify what one intends to speak about. Definitions are not themselves
true or false statements, but rather, are only more or less useful. They are
necessary to collect instances of the same kind from which the truth can
then be discerned. Accordingly, referents for important terms should be
plainly described to eliminate ad hoc ambiguities that muddy the path
toward a meaningful and helpful conclusion.
Even a casual survey of instances of the use of terrorism shows that
it is a contested category, often used as a ready-at-hand accusation applied to any disruptive activity disfavored by those in power.4 Oil company executives, for example, have attempted to score points by labeling

4. See Michael Loadenthal, Othering Terrorism: A Rhetorical Strategy of Strategic Labeling, 13 GENOCIDE STUD. & PREVENTION: AN INT’L J. 74, 95 (2019). See also ALEX SCHMID &
A.J. JONGMAN, POLITICAL TERRORISM: A NEW GUIDE TO ACTORS, AUTHORS, CONCEPTS, DATA
BASES, THEORIES, AND LITERATURE 5-6 (1988) (analyzing 109 different definitions of “terrorism”). Schmid & Jongman use their study to construct the following thorough definition:
Terrorism is an anxiety-inspiring method of repeated violent action, employed by
(semi-) clandestine individual, group, or state actors, for idiosyncratic, criminal, or political reasons, whereby—in contrast to assassination—the direct targets of violence
are not the main targets. The immediate human victims of violence are generally chosen randomly (targets of opportunity) or selectively (representative or symbolic targets) from a target population, and serve as message generators. Threat- and violencebased communication processes between terrorists (organization), (imperiled) victims,
and main targets are used to manipulate the main target (audience(s)), turning it into a
target of terror, a target of demands, or a target of attention, depending on whether
intimidation, coercion, or propaganda is primarily sought.
Id. at 28.
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pipeline protestors as “terrorists,”5 and a recent effort to make the Georgia
state code available for free online has been characterized as a “strategy
of terrorism” by the State.6 The “terrorist” label serves as the modern
analogy to epithets of communist in the 1950s, or witch from long ago, in
that they all share the quality of lacking firm content other than to categorize the target as deserving per se condemnation.
Formal settings fare little better. The UN Security Council has identified specific acts as terrorism while avoiding a general definition.7 Regional instruments have erred in the opposite direction by offering “more
than one hundred different proposed definitions of terrorism” between
1936 and 1981.8 The diversity of those outcomes, however, has frustrated
the effort to carve out a universally recognized customary international
crime.9
The present discussion favors restricting the category of terrorism
to acts which seek to provoke a change of policy by inflicting violence or
the threat of violence upon innocent civilians, rather than directly targeting the policymakers responsible for the contested circumstances, or their
agents.10 Without the criterion of targeting innocent proxies, terrorism becomes functionally indistinguishable from routine military conflicts. One
strategic assumption is presumably that threatened civilians will exert
pressure on authorities to meet the demands of the assailants. Alternatively, or, in systems where civilians lack any direct political authority
over the government, there is an assumption that the authorities have either compassion for their citizens, or fear of negative judgments on the
international stage sufficient to change their course.
This definition differs from some by requiring what other definitions may permit, namely, that the hallmark of terrorism is the targeting
of the morally innocent in order to provoke a change from a third party.11
For example, Per Bauhn argues that sacrificing the morally innocent to
5. Valerie Richardson, Dakota Access Pipeline Executive Compares Lawless Protestors to
Terrorists, WASH. TIMES (Feb. 15, 2017), http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2017/feb/15/dakota-access-exec-compares-protesters-terrorists/.
6. Adam Liptak, Accused of ‘Terrorism’ for Putting Legal Materials Online, N.Y. TIMES
(May 13, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/13/us/politics/georgia-official-code-copyright.
html.
7. BEN SAUL, DEFINING TERRORISM IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 319 (2006).
8. JEFFREY D. SIMON, LONE WOLF TERRORISM: UNDERSTANDING THE GROWING THREAT
259 (2013).
9. SAUL, supra note 7, at 318.
10. C.A.J. Coady, The Morality of Terrorism, 60 PHIL. 47, 52 (1985).
11. See Andrew H. Kydd & Barbara F. Walter, The Strategies of Terrorism, 31 INT’L SEC.
49, 51 (2006) (terming this the “attrition” goal of terrorism amongst the other identified goals of
intimidation, provocation, spoiling, and outbidding).
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intimidate others may be “a feature of some political terrorist acts, [but
not] all of them.”12 Other offerings concede the targeting of noncombatants as part of the definition, but expand this term to also encompass government officials who direct combat and military individuals who are not
actively engaged in combat at the moment of the terrorist attack.13 These
inclusions may satisfy a requirement of targeting technical noncombatants in the sense that they are not actively firing weapons at the moment
of the attack. However, these inclusions arguably violate the spirit of the
broader definition by protecting those who have the power to offer the
demanded concessions or who have an ongoing history of enforcing the
challenged rules, and in any event are not “innocent” in the same sense
as ordinary civilians.
Another way this definition varies from others is that it does not
categorically exclude states from the list of those who can commit acts of
terrorism.14 Although most states hold that only non-state actors can be
considered terrorists,15 this rhetoric can be seen as an attempt to portray
one’s own actions as legitimate military exercises, while construing the
actions of others as potentially illegitimate war crimes. The inconsistency
of this posture is quickly exposed by the ease with which states accuse
one another of terrorism.16 A state may even go so far as to baldly propose
plans that plainly cross the line into terrorism. For example, President
Trump called to attack jihadist leaders by “taking out their families.”17
President Trump later threatened to target Iranian sites of cultural

12. PER BAUHN, ETHICAL ASPECTS OF POLITICAL TERRORISM: THE SACRIFICING OF THE
INNOCENT 74 (1989).
13. Max Abrahms, Why Terrorism Does Not Work, 31 INT’L SEC. 42, 52 (2006) (including
military targets in his analysis to find that “[g]roups whose attacks on civilian targets outnumbered
attacks on military targets systematically failed to achieve their policy objectives.”).
14. Kydd and Walter strike a balance by, on the one hand, “not focus[ing] on state terrorism
because states face very different opportunities and constraints in their use of violence, and [because] the two cases are [not] similar enough to be profitably analyzed together,” while on the other
hand, defining terrorism in such a way that state terrorism is not necessarily precluded. Kydd &
Walter, supra note 11, at 52.
15. ALEX P. SCHMID, ROUTLEDGE HANDBOOK OF TERRORISM RESEARCH 48 (2011).
16. See Elaine Sciolino, U.S. Accuses Benin of Abetting Libyan Terrorism, N.Y. TIMES, May
20, 1988. See also Fred Pleitgen, Iranian Foreign Minister Accuses US of ‘State Terrorism’ as
Country’s Parliament Votes to Designate US Forces as ‘Terrorists’ (Jan. 7, 2020, 4:08 AM),
https://www.cnn.com/2020/01/07/middleeast/iran-zarif-united-states-intl/index.html.
17. John Fund, Trump’s Call to Kill Family Members of Terrorists is Quarter-Baked, NAT’L
REV. (Dec. 18, 2015, 9:00 AM), http://www.nationalreview.com/article/428719/kill-terroristsfamilies-gangsta-trump.
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heritage,18 an act which would constitute a war crime,19 but would also be
terroristic because civilians were the intended casualties. If attacking noncombatants to coerce military targets is the core criterion that defines terrorism, proposing this strategy as state policy would qualify as “state terrorism.” Despite the clear possibility of terrorist intentions by some state
actors, the majority of data on terrorism typically excludes state-authorized engagements that target noncombatants, perhaps placing them under
the category of “collateral damage.”
The stricter standard for “noncombatant” offered here has been defended elsewhere.20 Even if the available data is not consistently sorted to
this level of detail, the present definition reliably identifies acts that satisfy the key elements, allowing for a consistent comparison of events in
order to isolate helpful relationships and trends. Under this definition,
political assassinations or targeting soldiers—for example, the bombing
of the USS Cole—are at best crimes, but not terrorism. U.S. prosecutors
correctly declined to charge the Fort Hood shooter as a terrorist because
he had made deliberate efforts to target soldiers and avoid civilians.21
Similarly, under this standard, it is difficult to argue that the 1985
Oklahoma City bombing, which targeted a government building but incurred substantial collateral civilian casualties, was an act of terrorism.
The perpetrator, Timothy McVeigh claimed that he “did not know there
was a daycare center inside the building,” and that, had he known, it
might have given him pause to switch targets because “that’s a large
amount of collateral damage.”22 It would be harder still to argue that the
bombing constituted an act of terrorism while also maintaining that the
United States’ use of drones to kill military targets in civilian settings is
not.23 Neither is probably terrorism in the strict sense since civilians were
not the primary targets.
18. Martin Chulov et al., Trump Vows to Hit 52 Sites ‘Very Hard’ if Iran Retaliates Over
Suleimani Killing, THE GUARDIAN (Jan. 5, 2020, 5:11 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/world
/2020/jan/05/donald-trump-vows-to-hit-52-sites-very-hard-if-iran-retaliates-for-suleimani-killing.
19. See Prosecutor v. Al Mahdi, Case No. ICC-01/12-01/15, Judgment and Sentence (Sept.
27, 2016), https://www.icc-cpi.int/courtrecords/cr2016_07244.pdf. See also Hague Convention of
1907, annex, art. 27, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2277.
20. James A. Donovan, Civilian Immunity and the Rebuttable Presumption of Innocence, 5 J.
L. SOC’Y 409, 450-54 (2004).
21. PETER BERGEN, UNITED STATES OF JIHAD: WHO ARE AMERICA’S HOMEGROWN
TERRORISTS AND HOW DO WE STOP THEM? 84 (2016).
22. SIMON, supra note 8, at 48.
23. Some may argue that McVeigh was an independent actor, and thus only his acts were
terrorism. State actions are sometimes stipulated as necessarily falling outside the criteria that signal an event as terrorism. The justification for this exclusion may be because state misdeeds are
already liable under existing rules against war crimes and human rights violations. See Press Release, Security Council, Addressing Security Council, Secretary-General Calls on Counter-
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III. WHAT WE MEAN BY “SUICIDE TERRORISM”
Assuming that we have a solid grasp of what it means for an act to
be terrorism, we may believe that the elements of the subset suicide terrorism become immediately clear: Suicide terrorism is a form of terrorism by which the attackers must kill themselves in order for the attack on
innocent noncombatants to be successful. Common instances include detonating a bomb in a shopping center or steering a car into a sidewalk café.
It is not the death itself, but the perpetrator’s intent to die that serves as
the hallmark of suicide terrorism. Many terrorists are killed during attacks
(e.g., the 2002 Moscow theatre hostage crisis by Chechen separatists24),
but their deaths are not always an essential element of the plan, only collateral consequences of its execution. The literature therefore recognizes
a distinction between true suicide terrorism, and what has been termed
“Mumbai Style” attacks in which the terrorists’ deaths may have been the
most likely foreseeable outcome of the plot but which remain an outcome
the attackers will seek to avoid as long as possible, or even completely.25
The “why” of suicide terrorism has often been claimed to be that the
strategy is more effective than general terrorism.26 Because detonation
can be timed for optimal impact, one report found that each suicide attack
averaged 9.28 deaths as compared to the 1.92 deaths from general terrorist attacks.27 A similar gap exists on the question of whether suicide terrorism is more effective at achieving the intended strategic objectives:
Pape concludes that suicide terrorism is “associated with gains for the
Terrorism Committee to Develop Long-Term Strategy to Defeat Terror, U.N. Press Release
SC/7276 (Jan. 18, 2002) (quoting Jeremy Greenstock, Committee Chairman: “Concerning State
terrorism, the Committee had taken the trouble to proceed by consensus and keep subjectivism to
a minimum, he said. Resolution 1373 (2001) was the primary guide for the Committee, but the
Committee was also conscious of the 12 international Conventions on the subject, and none of them
referred to State terrorism, which was not an international legal concept. If States abused their
power, they should be judged against international conventions dealing with war crimes, international human rights and international humanitarian law.”). The present discussion does not recognize a meaningful distinction between state and non-state actors as a criterion to decide whether an
attack is or is not terrorism. Although some statements from then-UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan appear to favor excluding states from charges of terrorism, at other times he arguably favors
the position offered here, that “any deliberate attack on innocent civilians, regardless of one’s cause,
is unacceptable and fits into the definition of terrorism”. See also Press Conference with Foreign
Minister Kamal Kharrazi (unofficial transcript) (Jan. 26, 2002),https://www.un.org/sg/en/content/sg/press-encounter/2002-01-26/press-conference-foreign-minister-kamal-kharrazi-unofficial.
24. Richard Pilch & Adam Dolnik, The Moscow Theatre Hostage Crisis: The Perpetrators,
Their Tactics, and the Russian Response, 8 INT’L NEGOT. 577, 582 (2003).
25. Mark Dechesne & Bryn Brandt-Law, Suicide Terrorism, in HANDBOOK OF SUICIDAL
BEHAVIOUR 139, 141 (Updesh Kumar ed., 2017).
26. See DIEGO MURO, WHEN DOES TERRORISM WORK? (2019) (describing a general treatment on the effectiveness of terrorism).
27. Dechesne & Brandt-Law, supra note 25, at 150.
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terrorists’ political cause about half the time,”28 while general terrorism
is reported to attain only a seven percent success rate.29 More detailed
research, however, has concluded that suicides “appear to present little to
no advantages over non-suicide attacks, especially given the significant
costs associated with them.”30 According to Kydd and Walter, the range
of likely effectiveness is narrow and the attritional suicide bombings appear to be effective only against democracies because they are “more constrained in their ability to retaliate,” and are more likely to capitulate to
demands than authoritarian societies.31 Given such limited and uncertain
outcomes, the full tally of costs is likely to exceed rational benefits. Less
obvious motivations than body counts should therefore be considered
when deliberating the cause of suicide terrorism.
The conceptual problem arises in that, while most persons would
abhor the use of civilian casualties to advance political goals, such actions
are not beyond the ken of the ordinary observer. Terrorists may be crude
criminals, but we nonetheless can understand what goes through their
minds as they plot their heinous strategies. Their own deaths are a likely,
but possibly avoidable, outcome. The true suicide terrorist, though, because he intends and may even want to die, arguably exceeds our imaginative empathy.32
What unsettles observers about suicide terrorism centers not on the
willingness to sacrifice innocents to advance political objectives—ordinary warfare does as much, as the carpet bombing of Dresden and the
atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki demonstrated—but rather
on the reported eagerness with which such assignments of self-annihilation are often sought and executed. Many suicide terrorists are said to be
so excited by the idea that they seek out organizations promising the best
opportunities.33 The hope of becoming an honored martyr surpasses loyalty to a cause or group. Because “his sense of security is derived from
his passionate attachment and not from the excellence of his cause,”34
28. ROBERT A. PAPE, DYING TO WIN: THE STRATEGIC LOGIC OF SUICIDE TERRORISM 64
(2005).
29. Abrahms, supra note 13, at 51.
30. Joseph Mroszczyk, Dying for a Reason: An Empirical Assessment of the Tactical Utility
of Suicide Operations (2018), (Ph.D. dissertation, Northeastern University) (on file with Northeastern University).
31. Kydd & Walter, supra note 11, at 61.
32. Emad E. Aysha, Islamist Suicide Terrorism and Erich Fromm’s Social Psychology of
Modern Times, 5 J. SOC. & POL. PSYCH. 82, 82-83 (2017).
33. ARIEL MERARI, DRIVEN TO DEATH: PSYCHOLOGICAL AND SOCIAL ASPECTS OF SUICIDE
TERRORISM 121 (2010).
34. ERIC HOFFER, THE TRUE BELIEVER: THOUGHTS ON THE NATURE OF MASS MOVEMENTS
85 (Harper Perennial Mod. Classics reissued ed. 2010) (1951).
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being “a fighter for the cause becomes more important than the cause
itself.”35 The idea of someone lacking even the wish or hope to live and
instead rushing headlong to extinguish themselves in furtherance of a
sometimes lightly-held cause is uniquely disturbing because most of us
strive to survive. Our discomfort often leads us to dismiss the actor as
crazy or mentally ill.
Partisans of military conflicts are not typically known for a serious
interest in what motivates opponents. The natural default is to depict the
enemy as unreasonable, unnatural, certainly evil, or even arguably subhuman.36 Terrorists may be characterized in even harsher terms because
they target innocent civilians. For example, after the September 11, 2001
suicide attacks in New York City (more commonly known as 9/11), President George W. Bush stated that the terrorists acted because “they hate
our freedoms—our freedom of religion, our freedom of speech, our freedom to vote and assemble and disagree with each other.”37 Although
framed as a description of the terrorists’ point of view, such statements
are known to be inaccurate, conveying only what motivations the speakers project onto the actors.38 This depiction of terrorists offers little opportunity for a solution other than to seek their annihilation which, not
coincidentally, is often the path pursued.
One advocate for the illness model concluded that suicide terrorists
are “so consumed by pain, fear, crisis, and other personal problems that
the opportunity costs of their suicide becomes quite affordable . . . . volunteering to carry out a suicide attack would be like raising your hand
and saying, ‘Hi, I have serious mental health problems.’”39 This glib characterization well reflects our own society’s posture that suicidal tendencies are inherently unhealthy. If individuals who commit suicide are
therefore necessarily ill, all the more so are suicide terrorists who wish to
take others with them.

35. JERROLD M. POST, THE MIND OF THE
FROM THE IRA TO AL-QAEDA 61 (2007).

TERRORIST: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF TERRORISM

36. Jeanne M. Woods & James M. Donovan, “Anticipatory Self-Defense” and Other Stories,
14 KAN. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 487, 487 (2005).
37. George W. Bush, Former President of the United States, Address Before a Joint Session
of the Congress on the United States Response to the Terrorist Attacks of September 11 (Sept. 20,
2001), in 37 WEEKLY COMPILATION PRESIDENTIAL DOCUMENTS 1347, 1348, https://
www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/WCPD-2001-09-24/pdf/WCPD-2001-09-24-Pg1347.pdf.
38. SCOTT ATRAN, TRENDS IN SUICIDE TERRORISM: SENSE AND NONSENSE 5 (Aug. 2004),
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/268488742_trends_in_suicide_terrorism_sense_and_
nonsense/.
39. ADAM LANKFORD, THE MYTH OF MARTYRDOM: WHAT REALLY DRIVES SUICIDE
BOMBERS, RAMPAGE SHOOTERS, AND OTHER SELF-DESTRUCTIVE KILLERS 8, 174 (2013).
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Consequently, we experience a certain resistance to the evidence
that, despite our cultural predisposition, suicide terrorists are not uniquely
mentally ill. In fact, among experts, the suggestion that suicide attacks
are the result of mental illness has always been a minority view. First, the
epidemiology of mental illness and suicidal tendencies does not track the
rise and fall of suicide attacks. Nor does the theory account for the demographic skew of suicide terrorists toward the middle class,40 unless one is
also prepared to suggest that persons from those backgrounds are
uniquely vulnerable to psychological disfunction leading to suicide.41
More pointedly, direct evidence exists that puts the mental illness
hypothesis to rest. Ariel Merari and his colleagues conducted a controlled
study of the personality types of would-be suicide attackers. They found
that a majority (60%) of would-be suicides were diagnosed as dependentavoidant personality types, as opposed to only 16% of controls.42 By this,
Merari means that the would-be suicide attackers possessed “a pronounced lack of self-confidence, difficulty in making decisions independently, reliance on others’ opinions, reluctance to express disagreement out of fear that this may result in disapproval and rejection, and
willingness to carry out unpleasant tasks to please others.”43 Avoidant
personalities, moreover, are characterized by “timidity and fear of criticism, of being shamed or ridiculed.”44
The illness model, though, demands more than finding a consistent
personality profile, even an impressionable and compliant one. Merari
offers further data that speaks directly to the mental illness hypothesis.
He found that 40% of suicide bombers had suicidal tendencies, as compared to none in the control and attack organizer groups.45 This finding
initially appears to support the belief that suicide attackers display signs
of mental illness. However, viewing within-group comparisons undermines that simplistic conclusion. Merari reports that among those failed
attackers who actually pushed the button to execute a planned attack, only
25% fit the suicidal profile, as compared to 45.5% of the eleven who did

40. MERARI, supra note 33, at 75-77. See also SCOTT ATRAN, TALKING TO THE ENEMY:
FAITH, BROTHERHOOD, AND THE (UN)MAKING OF TERRORISTS 113, 115 (2010).
41. See e.g., Sang-Uk Lee et al., Suicide Rates across Income Levels: Retrospective Cohort
Data on 1 Million Participants Collected between 2003 and 2013 in South Korea, 27 J.
EPIDEMIOLOGY 258, 258 (2017) (arguing that risk for suicide increases as socioeconomic status
falls).
42. MERARI, supra note 33, at 112.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Ariel Merari et al., Personality Characteristics of “Self-Martyrs”/”Suicide Bombers” and
Organizers of Suicide Attacks, 22 TERRORISM AND POL. VIOLENCE 87, 95 (2009).
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not attempt to activate the device.46 Although based upon a small sample,
the striking result is that the more committed an attacker was to completing the mission, the less likely he was to possess the qualities that mental
illness advocates argue to be the sine qua non of the category.
If attackers are not driven by a perverse desire for self-extinction,
the motivation must lie elsewhere. Raphael Israeli has suggested that because suicide bombers lack the endogenous risk factors commonly associated with suicide, social factors prove determinative.47 As Marc Sageman pointed out, “social bonds play a more important role in the
emergence of the global Salafi jihad than ideology.”48 The importance of
social relationships over ideology had been identified earlier when
Franco Ferracuti reported that, in “terms of family background, [he] was
unable to distinguish among [Italian youths] those who became political
activists, those who became terrorists, those who joined a youth gang,
and those who entered the drug culture. The main determinant was who
one’s friends were.”49
This dynamic has been more recently highlighted by Scott Atran’s
work among terrorist networks. “The Hamburg group [behind the 9/11
attacks] wasn’t recruited or brainwashed. Like most Jihadi groups, it selfradicalized and then went looking for action. It was actually a fluid, constantly evolving network of friends and fellow travelers in search of making sense of their lives and the world.”50 He goes on to say, “People, including terrorists, don’t simply die for a cause; they die for each other,
especially their friends.”51 In fact, three of every four people who join
jihad groups “do so with friends.”52
The suggestion that suicide terrorists are driven by their ties to a
network of intimate relationships offers a starting point to consider more
deeply what moves them to such extreme and personally destructive actions.

46. MERARI, supra note 33, at 142.
47. Raphael Israeli, Islamikaze and Their Significance, 9 TERRORISM AND POL. VIOLENCE
96, 97, 105 (1997).
48. MARC SAGEMAN, UNDERSTANDING TERROR NETWORKS 178 (2004).
49. POST, supra note 35, at 60.
50. ATRAN, supra note 40, at 108.
51. Id. at 479. See also JULIE CHERNOV HWANG, WHY TERRORISTS QUIT: THE
DISENGAGEMENT OF INDONESIAN JIHADISTS 66 (2018).
52. Scott Atran, The Devoted Actor: Unconditional Commitment and Intractable Conflict
Across Cultures, 57 CURRENT ANTHROPOLOGY, S192, S199 (2016).
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IV. SUICIDE TERRORISTS’ MOTIVATION: SIGNIFICANCE QUEST THEORY
The “Significance Quest Theory” (SQT) from Arie Kruglanski and
his colleagues offers one of the literature’s better developed explanatory
models for terrorism. The theory builds upon initial premises we can accept as uncontroversial:
[1] “like other behaviors, terrorists’ behavior is goal driven and
[terrorism] constitutes the means through which individuals
choose to pursue their goal”; and [2] “this self-regulatory process of goal pursuit is carried out against a backdrop of cultural
meanings that determine what goals are worthy of pursuit and
what means are effective and legitimate for that purpose.”53
Granting those premises, the laundry list of possible motives found
in the literature for terrorism are not competing and contradictory explanations, but rather different expressions of “a more general motivational
rubric, the quest for significance.”54
Although Kruglanski had first attempted to explain suicide terrorism
as a kind of adolescent testosterone-fueled rebellion shaped by organizational agents,55 he later shifted to the description of death anxiety offered
by Ernest Becker’s The Denial of Death. Becker’s insight was that our
biological viability, both as a species and as individuals, depends upon
adequately coping with the awareness of personal mortality which is both
inevitable and stultifying. We are beings who have
a mind that soars out to speculate about atoms and infinity, who
can place himself imaginatively at a point in space and contemplate bemusedly his own planet. This immense expansion, this
dexterity, this ethereality, this self-consciousness gives to man
literally the status of a small god in nature. . . [Y]et, at the same
time . . . [that power of imagination reveals that] man is a worm
and food for worms.56
The contradiction between the inspiration to strive and the awareness that all such striving is ultimately pointless results in a state of

53. Arie W. Kruglanski et al., Terrorism as Means to an End: How Political Violence Bestows
Significance, in MEANING, MORTALITY, AND CHOICE: THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF EXISTENTIAL
CONCERNS 203, 206-07 (Phillip R. Shaver et al. eds., 2012).
54. Id. at 207. See also Katarzyna Jasco et al., Quest for Significance and Violent Extremism:
The Case of Domestic Radicalization, 38 POL. PSYCH. 815, 817-18 (2017); Michelle Dugas & Arie
W. Kruglanski, The Quest for Significance Model of Radicalization: Implications for the Management of Terrorist Detainees, 32 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 423, 424-29 (2014).
55. Arie W. Kruglanski et al., Individual Motivations, the Group Process and Organisational
Strategies in Suicide Terrorism, 3 J. POLICING, INTEL. & COUNTER TERRORISM 70 (2008).
56. ERNEST BECKER, THE DENIAL OF DEATH 26 (1973).
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existential paralysis. To cope with this paradox, humans devise techniques to assign symbolic meaning to our objectively meaningless existence. For some, the belief in personal significance can include participation in dramatic clashes in defense of matters of cosmic importance, or
deeds that will make one esteemed in the eyes of valued others. From this
process, Kruglanski extracts the insight that “the underlying force to
which we attribute the appeal of extreme behavior [lies in] the basic human desire to matter and have meaning in one’s life.”57 Resorting to violent, suicidal terrorist attacks are merely the actor’s quest to assign significance to their existence. Considerable empirical evidence supports the
predicted relationships derived from this theory.58 In the main, it works.
As SQT developed, however, this existential emphasis faded from
prominence. Perhaps not coincidentally, and despite the theory’s beginnings, Kruglanski eventually concedes that SQT is not uniquely tailored
to the problem of suicide terrorism: “the motivations involved in suicidal
and nonsuicidal types of terrorism may differ in degree rather than in
kind.”59 Most of his later writings focus on terrorism more broadly without offering special insight into suicide terrorism, arguably under the assumption that by shedding light on the former, we indirectly learn something about the latter.
Contrary to Kruglanski’s stance on this point, other writers have
concluded that general terrorism and suicide terrorism are “significantly
different. . . . [We] should not expect the same factors to account equally
well for suicide and nonsuicide terrorism.”60 Returning to Merari’s comparative study, we find evidence for this nonequivalence. Would-be suicides were found to have a significantly different psychological profile
from attack organizers,61 a result that appears to contradict the expectation
that these persons exist on the same continuum of functional attributes.
Each position—suicide terrorism as a subtype of terrorism, and suicide terrorism as qualitatively distinct—has empirical support. The case
may be that both are true, at least in their proper domains. Yet even if
suicide terrorism overlaps with terrorism, there will still be a residuum of
an unknown degree that cannot be accounted for by a theory such as SQT,
which intends to describe what the two behaviors have in common. A
57. Arie Kruglanski et al., The Making of Violent Extremists, 22 REV. GEN. PSYCH. 107
(2018).
58. See Arie W. Kruglanski et al., The Psychology of Radicalization and Deradicalization:
How Significance Quest Impacts Violent Extremism, 35 ADVANCES POL. PSYCH. 69 (2014).
59. Arie W. Kruglanski et al., Fully Committed: Suicide Bombers’ Motivation and the Quest
for Personal Significance, 30 POL. PSYCH. 331, 337 (2009).
60. PAPE, supra note 28, at 9.
61. MERARI, supra note 33, at 151.
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different theory would be needed to deal with the aspect of suicide terrorism that is not subsumed within terrorism generally.
The best reading of the data, therefore, suggests that, although sharing many traits, suicide terrorists and general terrorists will diverge on
only the characteristics thought to be critical to leading the former into
self-extinguishing actions. Fuller explanation beyond the quest for significance would then be needed to explain the unique aspects of the suicide
terrorist. An alternative candidate has placed at its heart the part of
Becker’s existential psychology that SQT declined to fully follow: death
anxiety.
V. SUICIDE TERRORISTS’ MOTIVATION, REVISED: TERROR MANAGEMENT
THEORY
For a variety of reasons, SQT fails to fully account for suicide terrorism. While criticisms of SQT exist,62 for present purposes, the larger
obstacles can be tied to the way in which the theory develops and diverges
from its original source material. As discussed below, minor adjustments
of emphasis can result in significant improvements in theoretical outcomes that lead to a clearer understanding of suicide terrorism.
Becker’s work gave rise to a theory, other than SQT, that built upon
the same problem of death awareness. While SQT attends to the problem
of meaninglessness by highlighting the immediate work to generate personal significance, Terror Management Theory (TMT) takes a more expansive view that considers in deeper detail which accomplishments will
in fact be recognized as significant.63
Becker explained that knowledge of our inevitable end creates the
problem of personal meaninglessness. He goes on to describe how the
paradox is resolved by cultural institutions that teach us how to escape
that tragic insignificance. Symbolic culture provides a shared template to
negate the pitiless lessons of the physical world. Death denial can take
various forms, from a belief in literal immortality via a soul-survival cult,
to the extension of the self beyond our material, doomed shell to be preserved through proxies such as children, religions, group affiliations, or
national allegiance. The major difference between SQT and TMT is that
for TMT the substitute must be validated by the group to be effective; the

62. Mia Bloom, Chasing Butterflies and Rainbows: A Critique of Kruglanski et al.’s “Fully
Committed: Suicide Bombers’ Motivation and the Quest for Personal Significance,” 30 POL.
PSYCH. 387 (2009).
63. Mark J. Landau et al., A Function of Form: Terror Management and Structuring the Social
World, 87 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH. 190 (2004).
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project of immortality is not a task for the private individual, contrary to
what SQT suggests in its emphasis on the quest for personal significance.
The result is a more comprehensive theoretical foundation for TMT:
[H]umans all manage the problem of knowing we are mortal by
calling on two basic psychological resources. First, we need to
sustain faith in our cultural worldview, which imbues our sense
of reality with order, meaning, and permanence . . . .
But we don’t just need to view life in general this way; we need to
view our own life this way. The paths to literal and symbolic immortality
laid out by our worldviews require us to feel that we are valuable members of our cultures. Hence, the second vital resource for managing terror
is a feeling of personal significance, commonly known as self-esteem.64
While SQT can shed light on the problem of terrorism, the more
complete model of TMT is required to explain suicide terrorism—one in
which SQT should be seen as a special and thus, more limited case. Although overlap exists between the two theories as a result of their shared
intellectual genealogy from Becker, SQT’s emphasis on TMT’s self-esteem prong yields a theory of terrorism that focuses on personal psychology, as it isolates the “need for closure” as the critical element leading to
violent extremism.65 By contrast, while also incorporating self-esteem
concerns, TMT embeds them within group institutions—making it at its
core a theory of culture. Although these are nuanced distinctions, the
broad claim here is that despite speaking in the same vocabulary of death
anxiety, TMT and SQT focus on different explanatory facets of the same
problem of suicide terrorism. While SQT may suffice to account for terrorism, of which suicide terrorism becomes a subspecies, TMT is necessary to understand the aspects of suicide terrorism that are not reducible
to self-esteem. TMT is able to do this because it begins with the prior
need to annul death anxiety.
Although the idea of culture built into TMT remains a challenging
concept for many social scientists,66 the term references an important
frame through which a wide range of existential problems can be approached. Culture offers ready-made, easily understood solutions to the
64. SHELDON SOLOMON ET AL., THE WORM AT THE CORE: ON THE ROLE OF DEATH IN LIFE
9 (2015).
65. David Weber et al., The Road to Extremism: Field and Experimental Evidence that Significance Loss-Induced Need for Closure Fosters Radicalization, 114 J. PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCH. 270 (2018).
66. DAVID BERLINER, LOSING CULTURE: NOSTALGIA, HERITAGE, AND OUR ACCELERATED
TIMES 97 (Dominic Horsfall trans. 2020) (“[I]n this era of globalization and transnational movements, it is problematic to speak of cultures, in the sense of clearly outlined entities with welldefined contours, attached to a specific territory and language.”).
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most common difficulties confronting a social entity mired in an existential paradox. When remedies are shared, they demand less psychological
effort to maintain correct explanations of how the world works and where
death-defying meaning is read.
Once internalized, these solutions become the raw material out of
which personal identity is then forged. As explained in one classic ethnography,
being a Tahitian is having a “Tahitian mind,” operating with assumptions and motives which have been shaped by various aspects of growing up and of everyday life in Tahitian communities. People act in a Tahitian way and “conform” to
Tahitian culture because it is the natural thing for them to do.67
As with the Tahitians, so for us all. Culture tells us who we are,
directs us how to behave, and teaches us what matters. To lose this basis
of self-identity, and to have “slipped out of the warm embrace of a culture
into the cold air of a fragmentary existence,”68 can result in the disintegration of mental health. The inability to rely upon cultural resources to
bolster identity is known to increase rates of suicide,69 or at least undermine the will to survive.70
Because most people will not experience the loss of their own culture, the process can be best illustrated through the way anthropologists
undergo a lesser version of this break during their fieldwork. Alone in an
unfamiliar environment, struggling in a foreign tongue to forge intimate
bonds by assuming the role of a child who must be taught even the most
simple social norms, the student “loses his sense of self-esteem and selfworth reflected back from others… ‘One’s concept of self disintegrates
because the accustomed responses have disappeared.’”71 Formerly reflexive modes of social interaction are now exhausting and intense efforts
requiring the fledgling anthropologist to consciously navigate each situation. Culture shock, even in such small and relatively temporary

67. ROBERT I. LEVY, TAHITIANS: MIND AND EXPERIENCE IN THE SOCIETY ISLANDS 326
(1973).
68. EDWARD SAPIR, CULTURE, LANGUAGE AND PERSONALITY: SELECTED ESSAYS 97
(1966).
69. Antoon A. Leenaars et al., Genocide and Suicide Among Indigenous People: The North
Meets the South, 19 CAN. J. NATIVE STUD. 337 (1999).
70. SVEN LINDQVIST, “EXTERMINATE ALL THE BRUTES”: ONE MAN’S ODYSSEY INTO THE
HEART OF DARKNESS AND THE ORIGINS OF EUROPEAN GENOCIDE 143 (Joan Tate trans., The New
Press 1997).
71. JOHN L. WENGLE, ETHNOGRAPHERS IN THE FIELD: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF RESEARCH 9
(1988) (quoting Ruth Landes).
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circumstances as these, “leans toward the view that, for the individual,
the loss of his sense of identity is a symbolic death.”72
Given the essential role of culture in creating personality, the hypothesis offered here is that a fresh understanding of suicide terrorism
will come from looking broadly at the defense of the cultural institutions
that define what makes the actor feel significant.73 These norms charter
the rules for symbolic immortality— the ultimate end purchased through
the coin of notoriety and significance. The suicide terrorist operates, in
Scott Atran’s words, using a logic of appropriateness, not a logic of consequences.74 In other words, actions, even when they may make little
sense in terms of the strategic objectives that are likely to be achieved or
the immediate personal benefit such as renown as a martyr for the cause,
can still make perfect sense under TMT when the goal is to define oneself
by defending the master paradigm through which one can escape the
death paradox.75 SQT operates when this more fundamental dilemma is
already resolved or taken for granted.
Given the role that cultural values play in the definition of the self,
TMT expects “that the mere existence of another [cultural worldview]
destabilizes one’s own worldview, and by doing so it reduces its bufferfunction.”76 TMT thus anticipates increased anxiety when alternative existential solutions exist side-by-side, but more so when the worldview
employed to build self-esteem is under direct attack, which contributes to
a “lethal cocktail that encourages violence.”77
The resulting sequelae would be unexpected by SQT. “TMT can explain the motivation behind terrorist acts, and why individuals have the
propensity to inflict destruction and death upon innocent victims, simply
because they do not share common religious, political, or cultural views,”
an action that bears no direct benefit if the goal is to increase personal
significance.78 Moreover, SQT problematizes “radicalization” under the
72. Id. at 10.
73. The assumption for this position is that suicide bombers possess higher levels of death
anxiety than the general population, or even other, nonsuicidal terrorists.
74. ATRAN, supra note 40, at 393.
75. Jeremy Ginges et al., Sacred Bounds on Rational Resolution of Violent Political Conflict,
104 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. U.S. AM. 7357, 7359 (2007).
76. ROMAN PRINZ, TERROR MANAGEMENT THEORY: WHAT ROLE DO CULTURAL WORLD
VIEWS PLAY IN THE CAUSE AND PREVENTION OF TERRORISM? 8 (2010); Sheldon Solomon et al.,
Pride and Prejudice: Fear of Death and Social Behavior, 9 CURRENT DIRECTIONS PSYCH. SCI.
200, 201 (2000).
77. Tom Pyszczynski et al., Righteous Violence: Killing for God, Country, Freedom and Justice, 1 BEHAV. SCI. TERRORISM & POL. AGGRESSION 12, 15 (2009).
78. Miliaikeala Heen et al., Terror Management, Crime, and Law, in DENYING DEATH: AN
INTERDISCIPLINARY APPROACH TO TERROR MANAGEMENT THEORY 62, 66 (Lindsey A. Harvell
& Gwendelyn S. Nisbett eds., 2016).
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apparent premise that beliefs are not to be taken seriously, and that those
who treat them as Tillich’s “ultimate concern[s]”79 are somehow unbalanced. TMT, in contrast, predicts that such convictions are at the center
of everyone’s personality, and that to preserve them, a person will strive
to reinforce the cultural worldviews, perhaps, as Becker noted, by seeking
or forcing conversions: “[P]eople try so hard to win converts for their
point of view because it is more than merely an outlook on life: it is an
immortality formula”80 whose validity grows when there are fewer opposing viewpoints.
From this perspective, deeds to defend one’s mechanism for proxy
immortality are literal acts of self-preservation, up to and including the
death of the physical body which is doomed in any case. The paradoxical
result, as Kruglanski has noted, is that “[T]he willingness to die in an act
of suicide terrorism may be motivated by the desire to live forever,”81 a
hypothesis that has received some on-point experimental verification.82
All of the different motivations offered by other scholars to explain suicide terrorism are thereby reducible to either triggers for existential anxiety about the threats to one’s cultural lifeboat or immersion in the network of relationships that signify the greater whole as a defense against
perceived dangers.
VI. THE ATTACK ON LOCAL IMMORTALITY FORMULAS: FORCED
CONVERSION TO GLOBAL CONSUMER CAPITALISM
The shift from SQT to TMT may seem like a small change. However, TMT promises to be more theoretically productive because it contains explanatory power beyond what can be achieved by focusing solely
on the individual’s quest for personal significance. For example, TMT,
but not SQT, can accommodate the finding that those with prior religious
commitments were less vulnerable to “militant interpretations of Islam
that allow self-bombing” than those who were “Islamic in name only,”83
because the former already have “a base philosophy which is likely to

79. PAUL TILLICH, THE ESSENTIAL TILLICH: AN ANTHOLOGY OF THE WRITINGS OF PAUL
TILLICH 33 (1987).
80. BECKER, supra note 56, at 255.
81. KRUGLANSKI, supra note 59, at 336.
82. Clay Routledge & Jamie Arndt, Self-Sacrifice as Self-Defence: Mortality Salience Increases Efforts to Affirm a Symbolic Immortal Self at the Expense of the Physical Self, 38 EUR. J.
SOC. PSYCH. 531 (2008).
83. Khapta Akhmedova & Anne Speckhard, A Multi-Causal Analysis of the Genesis of Suicide Terrorism: The Chechen Case, in TANGLED ROOTS: SOCIAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL FACTORS
IN THE GENESIS OF TERRORISM 324 (Jeff Victoroff ed., 2006).
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offer some psychological buffer and protection to deal with death and
other serious traumatic events.”84
This Part further illustrates the productivity of TMT by examining
a significant problem about which SQT has had little to say: how do we
account for the historical fact that while terrorism has a long modern history, suicide attacks did not appear until the early 1980s, and when they
did appear, they were very irregular across the map? Even allowing that
suicide terrorism was not a feasible strategy until the development of appropriate explosives and trigger mechanisms, there remains a discrepancy. If the two forms of violence—terrorism and suicide terrorism—are
expressions of the same psychological motives, we should expect the latter tactic to be utilized as soon as the tools become available, and in any
place that was already experiencing terrorist attacks. Yet this expectation
is not supported by historical patterns.
The National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses
to Terrorism (START) maintains a database of terrorist incidents across
the globe from 1970 to present.85 The criteria for inclusion is broader than
discussed earlier, and does not limit or code its events for the targeting of
noncombatants. However, the general thrust of the trends remains useful
for present purposes. Only the time period from 1981—the Lebanon suicide attack of that year was the “first major contemporary suicide attack”86—through 2018 is presented here. Initial consideration has been
limited to eleven focal countries with some of the heaviest attacks of suicide terrorism. Table 1 reports the incidents of suicide [Sui] relative to
nonsuicide [NSui] terrorism.
Table 1: Annual Suicide and Non-Suicide Terrorist Attacks
Egypt

India

Israel

Lebanon

Nigeria

Pakistan

Nsui

Sui

Nsui

Sui

Nsui

Sui

Nsui

Sui

Nsui

Sui

Nsui

Sui

1981

9

0

16

0

36

0

80

1

0

0

4

0

1982

1

0

13

0

71

0

119

1

0

0

4

0

1983

0

0

47

0

31

0

230

4

3

0

9

0

1984

0

0

159

0

25

0

164

2

0

0

3

0

1985

2

0

39

0

19

1

80

15

0

0

2

0

1986

4

0

96

0

48

0

103

3

0

0

24

0

84. Anne Speckhard & Khapta Akhmedova, Black Widows and Beyond: Understanding the
Motivations and Life Trajectories of Chechen Female Suicide Terrorists, in FEMALE TERRORISM
AND MILITANCY: AGENCY, UTILITY, AND ORGANIZATION 100, 109 (Cindy Ness ed., 2008).
85. Global Terrorism Database, https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/ (last visited Nov. 14, 2020).
86. ATRAN, supra note 38, at 1.
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1987

7

0

166

0

23

0

92

2

0

0

60

0

1988

9

0

358

0

35

0

123

2

2

0

44

0

1989

7

0

324

0

86

1

141

0

0

0

45

0

1990

13

0

339

0

98

0

83

1

0

0

87

0

1991

10

0

338

1

64

0

91

0

3

0

150

0

1992

79

0

237

0

78

0

91

0

11

0

85

0

1993

49

1

42

0

21

1

36

1

0

0

8

0

1994

143

0

107

0

51

4

67

0

8

0

154

0

1995

102

0

179

0

11

2

38

0

1

0

664

2

1996

51

0

213

0

14

5

38

1

11

0

180

0

1997

22

0

193

0

11

2

45

1

20

0

206

0

1998

3

0

59

2

13

1

22

1

2

0

36

1

1999

1

0

111

1

6

2

41

1

18

0

39

0

2000

0

0

179

1

15

0

12

0

6

0

49

0

2001

0

0

228

6

54

25

5

0

5

0

53

0

2002

0

0

180

4

30

45

8

0

6

0

44

2

2003

0

0

193

3

20

18

5

0

9

0

26

3

2004

0

3

106

2

12

7

1

0

6

0

62

5

2005

0

2

143

3

38

5

17

0

9

0

72

5

2006

5

0

165

2

77

4

7

1

37

0

157

7

2007

0

0

146

3

52

1

17

1

61

0

202

58

2008

1

0

528

6

131

3

57

1

76

0

531

37

2009

2

0

671

1

36

0

14

0

42

0

620

47

2010

2

0

663

0

13

1

5

0

63

0

679

34

2011

16

2

645

0

50

1

10

0

171

4

969

43

2012

49

0

610

1

64

1

15

0

580

36

1602

52

2013

312

9

691

3

37

0

115

6

342

4

2135

80

2014

349

5

859

1

293

0

191

13

674

40

2108

43

2015

631

16

878

6

58

0

40

4

511

127

1213

30

2016

367

9

1017

8

49

1

39

2

479

54

2016

31

2017

208

16

960

6

32

0

21

2

360

124

688

31

2018

53

6

888

2

63

0

7

0

645

60

480

25

Totals

2507

69

12786

62

1865

131

2270

66

4161

449

15510

536
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Table 1 (cont.): Annual Suicide and Non-Suicide Terrorist Attacks
Russia
Nsui

Somalia

Sui

Sri Lanka

Turkey

Yemen

Nsui

Sui

Nsui

Sui

Nsui

Sui

Nsui

Sui

1981

8

0

2

0

8

0

0

0

1982

0

0

2

0

5

0

0

0

1983

1

0

7

0

5

0

0

0

1984

2

0

81

0

19

0

0

0

1985

0

0

110

0

2

0

0

0

1986

0

0

142

0

7

0

0

0

1987

1

0

114

1

43

0

0

0

1988

2

0

350

0

42

0

0

0

1989

2

0

510

0

114

0

0

0

1990

12

0

140

1

195

0

0

0

1991

8

0

113

2

293

0

5

0

1992

21

0

21

0

102

1

514

0

24

0

1993

4

0

23

0

7

2

29

0

6

0

1994

47

0

57

0

32

3

300

0

19

0

1995

37

0

13

0

115

11

133

0

8

0

1996

66

0

16

0

170

6

51

3

8

0

1997

77

0

19

0

59

5

44

0

19

0

1998

26

0

1

0

26

9

20

3

7

0

1999

54

0

4

0

35

11

98

11

17

0

2000

128

10

9

0

52

16

34

1

8

2

2001

133

2

5

0

30

6

17

2

7

0

2002

86

3

3

0

3

0

5

0

7

0

2003

66

10

1

0

8

1

14

5

7

0

2004

36

8

1

0

32

1

26

1

0

0

2005

64

0

6

0

133

0

40

1

7

0

2006

54

2

8

2

208

7

41

2

4

1

2007

49

2

153

3

126

6

29

0

6

1

2008

169

1

169

3

87

13

31

1

20

2

2009

147

5

120

2

25

12

12

1

21

2

2010

240

11

126

4

3

0

20

0

105

7

2011

182

6

177

8

0

0

49

2

111

7

2012

143

8

308

17

4

0

185

3

276

36

2013

135

9

325

17

14

0

41

1

405

20
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2014

47

1

848

24

16

0

93

1

726

37

2015

21

0

393

25

11

0

417

5

627

37

2016

51

4

562

40

1

0

518

24

472

53

2017

29

4

571

43

41

0

172

9

211

15

2018

23

4

527

30

7

0

94

0

325

5

Totals

2135

90

4502

218

2918

114

3760

76

3458

225

Comparing the national statistics reveals first that suicide attacks are
never a preferred strategy, and rarely account for more than ten percent,
typically much less, of the total terrorist attacks experienced by a country.
More immediately relevant is the observation that suicide attacks do not
begin to appear across nations at the same time, suggesting that their appearance is not a function of technological feasibility. For example, Lebanon was experiencing suicide attacks in the early 1980s, but they were
not seen in Pakistan, despite a similar history of general terrorism, until
the mid-1990s.
This irregularity is not accidental. Taking the wider view, Dechesne
and Bandt-Law find enough consistency to argue that suicide terrorism
arose in roughly four clusters across different periods and locations.87 If
the resort to suicide attacks is therefore not dependent upon technology,
what changes prompted the uneven resort to this new form of armed resistance?
In answering this question, we note that although the colonial era
had largely passed by the 1980s, the structural relationships it birthed
have arguably been preserved with new economies that track the market
domination of the Western powers. In other words, “the neo-colonialism
of multi-national corporations is only the latest, most sophisticated form
of indirect rule” that had typified the British empire.88 While many scholars study these developments from political or economic perspectives,
Erich Fromm has argued that they also have a psychological impact:
Fromm argued that the more modernity advances, the smaller
you feel. This is due to having lost touch with all the original
“medieval ties” – clan, tribe, sect, guild, extended family, neighbourhood, etc. – that formed the premodern basis of personal
identity. Modernity then has given birth to the individual while
leaving him (or her) defenceless, alone and alienated against his
opposite, society . . . . Thus the “individual overcomes the feeling of insignificance in comparison with the overwhelming
87. Dechesne & Brandt-Law, supra note 25, at 146.
88. Michael H. Fisher, Indirect Rule in the British Empire: The Foundations of the Residency
System in India (1764-1858), 18 MOD. ASIAN STUD. 393, 395 (1984).
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power of the world outside of himself either by renouncing his
individual integrity, or by destroying others so that the world
ceases to be threatening.”89
In order to apply this insight, we need additional details on how this
disruptive modernity was introduced into the impacted societies. The vector considered here is the spread of consumer capitalism. Developing societies, which often did not share the individualist consumer mentality
upon which capitalist enterprises depend, nonetheless “were forced by
financial pressures and international institutions to conform to the dominant American model of capitalism.”90 This policy, even when generating
material benefits, on the whole resulted in a deterioration of local conditions.
Prior studies have shown that neither corporate globalization,91 nor
economic development,92 is sufficient by itself to give rise to terrorist incidents within a country’s borders. To achieve those economic goals in
the developing markets, though, the worldviews of the subject population
must be manipulated.93 This usurpation of the indigenous worldview, to
be replaced with one radically different, one favoring transplanted market
values, threatens an existential crisis. This process could explain the uneven introduction of suicide attacks.
Capitalism thrives not simply by making its goods available to new
customers, but by aggressive advertising to create the perceived need for
those goods. While early advertisements focused on the product’s
straightforward description and attributes,94 by the 1920s marketing had
shifted focus to new needs and insecurities that the offered products
promised to fill.95 Advertising “helps to keep the masses dissatisfied with
their mode of life, discontented with the ugly things around them. Satisfied customers are not as profitable as discontented ones.”96 As the classic
89. Aysha, supra note 32, at 85-86.
90. JAMES FULCHER, CAPITALISM: A VERY SHORT INTRODUCTION 98-99 (2nd ed. 2015).
91. Quan Li & Drew Schaub, Economic Globalization and Transnational Terrorism: A
Pooled Timed-Series Analysis, 48 J. CONFLICT RESOL. 230, 254 (2004).
92. Martin Gassebner & Simon Luechinger, Lock, Stock, and Barrel: A Comprehensive Assessment of the Determinants of Terror, 149 PUB. CHOICE 235, 254 (2011).
93. See generally JONATHAN LEVY, FREAKS OF FORTUNE: THE EMERGING WORLD OF
CAPITALISM AND RISK IN AMERICA (2012) (describing a study of changes that the rise of the capitalist economy provoked in the self-understanding of the individual, especially in the context of
responsibility for ultimate economic success).
94. Monica Brasted, The Values of the Consumer Culture: Reflected in the Advertisements
of “The Saturday Evening Post”: 1900-1929 70 (2002) (Ph.D. dissertation, Pennsylvania State University) (on file with the Pennsylvania State University system).
95. WINSTON FLETCHER, ADVERTISING: A VERY SHORT INTRODUCTION 99 (2010).
96. STUART EWEN, CAPTAINS OF CONSCIOUSNESS: ADVERTISING AND THE SOCIAL ROOTS
OF CONSUMER CULTURE 39 (1976).

FINAL_FOR_JCI

2021]

8/3/21 4:45 PM

Theories Grounding Suicide Terrorism

23

sociological study Middletown recounts, advertising since the turn of the
century concentrated “increasingly upon a type of copy aiming to make
the reader emotionally uneasy, to bludgeon him with the fact that decent
people don’t live the way he does.”97 Famous examples of creating insecurities to sell merchandise include the histories of antiperspirants98 and
mouthwash.99 Consequently,
[a] major outcome of globally mediated promises of a good life
has been that people around the world perceive their immediate
lifeworld as worthless and hopeless. As a consequence, “globalization is by many people primarily experienced in its absence,
in the form of the non-arrival of change, unfulfilled promises
and aspirations rather than in an actual increase of mobility or
flux of goods.”100
Cast in the terms of the present argument, for capitalism to succeed
it must not only undermine the self-esteem prong of TMT, but also substitute itself as a competing view of the standards by which consumers
will adjudge themselves to be significant.101
Consumer values serve to assign meaning and significance to the
individual’s existence, and in that way emerge as a competing culturally
fostered solution to the death paradox. In this context, Becker specifically
analyzed money as the “new universal immortality ideology.”102 Gold and
money has become, he says, the immortality symbol for the West.103 Tennessee Williams described the relationship this way:
The human animal is a beast that dies and if he’s got money he
buys and buys and buys and I think the reason he buys
97. ROBERT S. LYND & HELEN MERRILL LYND, MIDDLETOWN: A STUDY IN
CONTEMPORARY AMERICAN CULTURE 82 (1929).
98. Sarah Everts, How Advertisers Convinced Americans They Smelled Bad, SMITHSONIAN
MAG. (Aug. 2, 2012), https://www.smithsonianmag.com/history/how-advertisers-convinced-americans-they-smelled-bad-12552404/.
99. Laura Clark, How Halitosis Became a Medical Condition With a “Cure”, SMITHSONIAN
MAG. (Jan. 29, 2015), https://www.smithsonianmag.com/smart-news/marketing-campaign-invented-halitosis-180954082/.
100. JOSKA SAMULI SCHIELKE, EGYPT IN THE FUTURE TENSE: HOPE FRUSTRATION, AND
AMBIVALENCE BEFORE AND AFTER 2011 35 (2015) (quoting Knut Graw).
101. Brasted, supra note 94, at 31 (“The consumer revolution is now seen to have changed the
Western concepts of time, space, society, the individual, family and state. The meanings carried by
goods resocialize “the people,” change their concepts of themselves, their concepts of society and
most of all their social aspirations by changing their concept of consumption and consumer
goods.”).
102. ERNEST BECKER, ESCAPE FROM EVIL 73-90 (1975).
103. Id. at 74; Tyler F. Stillman & Lindsey A. Harvell, Marketing, Money, and Mortality, in
DENYING DEATH: AN INTERDISCIPLINARY APPROACH TO TERROR MANAGEMENT THEORY 84,
84-85 (Lindsey A. Harvell & Gwendelyn S. Nisbett eds., 2016).
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everything he can buy is that in the back of his mind he has the
crazy hope that one of his purchases will be life everlasting.104
The rise of this new significance strategy inevitably sparks competition with prior worldviews. But whereas traditional religions tend to be
anxiety-reducing institutions, capitalism thrives by creating anxiety, not
alleviating it. That reversal makes it an exceptionally poor replacement
for the prior death anxiety solutions.
Even in the United States, where one might expect the hedonic benefits of material consumption to be the most plainly visible, one finds the
opposite. Excessive choices arising from material abundance cumulatively cause distress that results from “regret, concern about status, adaptation, social comparison, and perhaps most important, the desire to have
the best of everything—to maximize.”105 This “tyranny of small decisions,”106 which has been shown to “contribute to the recent epidemic of
clinical depression affecting much of the Western world,”107 is embedded
in a broader context wherein the necessity of material acquisition serves
as the means to social acceptability, leading Americans to feel the perpetual humiliation of never having enough.108
As a result, about 20% of adults in the United States suffer from a
mental illness, and for 4.6% of adults these issues are serious.109 In one
comparative study, the 26.4% of Americans who have experienced any
of the recorded Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders
[fourth edition (DSM-IV)] illnesses in the last twelve months ranked the
highest out of fourteen countries.110 We have seen increased psychopathology among college students,111 with the suicide rate among younger
Americans increasing dramatically from 1999 to 2017.112

104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.

TENNESSEE WILLIAMS, CAT ON A HOT TIN ROOF 45-46 (1954).
BARRY SCHWARTZ, THE PARADOX OF CHOICE: WHY MORE IS LESS 221 (2004).
Id. at 21.
Id. at 5.
Id. at 191-92.
U.S. DEPT. OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, KEY SUBSTANCE USE AND MENTAL
HEALTH INDICATORS IN THE UNITED STATES: RESULTS FROM THE 2018 NATIONAL SURVEY ON
DRUG USE AND HEALTH 43-44 (2019).
110. Koen. Demyttenaere et al., Prevalence, Severity, and Unmet Need for Treatment of Mental
Disorders in the World Health Organization World Mental Health Surveys, 291 JAMA 2581, 2584
(2004).
111. Jean M. Twenge et al., Birth Cohort Increases in Psychopathology Among Young Americans, 1938-2007: A Cross-Temporal Meta-Analysis of the MMPI, 30 CLINICAL PSYCH. REV. 145,
149, 152 (2010).
112. U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUM. SERVS., CS298851, SUICIDE MORTALITY IN THE
UNITED STATES, 1999-2017 (2018); Oren Miron et al., Suicide Rates Among Adolescents and
Young Adults in the United States, 2000-2017, 321 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 2362, 2362 (2019).
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These outcomes are unsurprising when viewed against the change
in United States’ commercial morality from the 1920s, when the patent
for the isolation of human insulin was transferred for the public good for
a token $1.00. In the present day, United States’ drug company CEOs
raise the costs of their medicines enormously in the belief that, “it is a
moral requirement to make money when you can.”113 Under the push of
advertising, in sum, the last hundred years has seen our cultural emphasis
shift from ideals of intrinsic virtues to those of extrinsic materialism.
All told, to the extent that “people have adopted the ‘American
dream’ of stuffing their pockets, they seem to that extent to be emptier of
self and soul.”114 It is important to note that this outcome is not because
consumer capitalism has been abused or poorly implemented. The negative effects flow from the way that capitalism necessarily operates. Capitalism by definition creates desires that can never be satisfied:
This is the genius of the capitalist process: by actually providing
goods and gratifications on the condition of constant growth,
capitalism constantly raises expectations, undermines lives and
livelihoods that once were safe and certain, and creates pressures and promises that once would have been unimaginable.
These pressures are troublesome even under conditions of relative wealth.115
The last point is striking. To argue, as some do, that the system
“works” because poor people are better off than poor people were a hundred years ago116 misses the point, because life satisfaction is not a simple
function of what a person has, but also what he has relative to others.117
As Marx had earlier noted, as societies become wealthier, people redefine
what subsistence means.118 Because the standards necessarily recede beyond reach, the new religion of wealth, in the end, does not and inherently
cannot perform adequately as a death paradox-mitigating worldview.

113. Jessie Hellmann, Drug Company CEO Calls 400 Percent Price Hike ‘Moral Requirement,’ THE HILL (Sept. 11, 2018), https://thehill.com/policy/healthcare/406103-ceo-of-drug-company-calls-400-percent-price-increase-moral-requirement.
114. TIM KASSER, THE HIGH PRICE OF MATERIALISM xi (2002).
115. SCHIELKE, supra note 100, at 227.
116. Marian L. Tupy, Global Poverty’s Defeat Is Capitalism’s Triumph, CATO INST. (Oct. 10,
2015), http://www.cato.org/publications/commentary/global-povertys-defeat-capitalisms-triumph.
117. Robb B. Rutledge et al., The Social Contingency of Momentary Subjective Well-Being,
NATURE COMMC’NS, June 2016; ATRAN, supra note 38, at 8. See W.G. RUNCIMAN, RELATIVE
DEPRIVATION AND SOCIAL JUSTICE (Univ. of Cal. Press ed. 1966) (explaining an early work on
the problem of relative deprivation).
118. Richard Nordahl, A Marxian Approach to Human Rights, in CROSS-CULTURAL
PERSPECTIVES: A QUEST FOR CONSENSUS 162, 171 (Abdullahi Ahmed An-Naʿim ed., 1992).
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Despite these significant negative consequences, and because capitalism must expand into new markets to survive, this failed worldview is
aggressively imposed across the globe because of the one dimension on
which capitalism does perform well—raw monetary benefits. Market
capitalism is backed by massive military and economic coercive power
to the detriment of the traditional institutions that offered more effective
solutions to the death paradox. Thus, market capitalism has been introduced into cultural environments that did not contain the elemental precursors that would have made it less of an alien intrusion. The result has
been a transition from a society of communally-based independent producers into one of individualistic passive consumers, a change that has
proved traumatic even for Americans.119
It is in this sense that one may view the incursion of capitalist values
as a forced religious conversion120 that some may not happily endure,
leading in some instances to dramatic blowback. This is the background
against which the differential appearance of suicide terrorism becomes
comprehensible. The exportation of American values of “relentless consumerism, atomized societies, the interpretation of freedom as no rules
and no responsibility, and glorification of vulgarity and violence in film
and music” which “steal[] the identity of the oppressed,” offers nothing
but “a new colonial system”121 that creates a “source of potential humiliation and worldview threat that could increase the appeal of radical Islamist movements.”122
According to Atran once said the following, “Violent extremism
represents not the resurgence of traditional cultures but their collapse as
young people unmoored from millennial traditions flail about in search
of a social identity that gives personal significance and glory. This is the
dark side of globalization.”123
Here, he restates an observation first recorded by Hoffer almost seventy years earlier: “The discontent generated in backward [sic] countries
by their contact with Western civilization is not primarily resentment
against exploitation by domineering foreigners. It is rather the result of a
crumbling or weakening of tribal solidarity and communal life.”124 The
new element to be considered is how cultural factors may have shaped
119. EWEN, supra note 96, at 58.
120. RONI ZIRINSKI, AD HOC ARABISM: ADVERTISING, CULTURE, AND TECHNOLOGY IN
SAUDI ARABIA 133 (2005).
121. JESSICA STERN, TERROR IN THE NAME OF GOD: WHY RELIGIOUS MILITANTS KILL 295,
283, 40 (2003).
122. Pyszczynski et al., supra note 77, at 22.
123. Atran, supra note 52, at S199.
124. HOFFER, supra note 34, at 38.
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the acceptable form of suicide in some Middle Eastern societies.125 In the
face of foreign values that contradict the local death-denying mores, “If
one is chronically unsuccessful at convincing oneself of the inferior nature of the competing [cultural worldview], a more grim, final solution,
as so many terrorist fascists have concluded, is simply to obliterate the
offending presence.”126 TMT thus predicts what SQT cannot:
[C]onfidence in a particular worldview can be restored by annihilating those who do not share that view, thus proving conclusively that the victor must have been right after all. From this
perspective, then, prejudice (and the violent conflicts that often
result from it) can be understood, at least in part, as an inevitable
consequence of competition between death-denying cosmological visions.127
The hypothesis here is that pressure on existing worldviews in
places into which the West has prematurely introduced a capitalistic
mindset began to reach a cultural tipping point in the years leading up to
the 1980s. The empirically observed differential resort to suicide terrorism is therefore a function of the timing of the full brunt of capitalist insertion and the degree to which Western-style consumerism has undermined the local techniques for death denial. For resistors, the choice
becomes either to capitulate to the new worldview that is demonstrably
inferior in terms of resolving the death paradox, thereby leading to pathological anxieties, or to aggressively reassert and defend the old lifeways
that let one feel that life is meaningful. In this confluence of competing
cultural forces, suicide attacks whereby actors seek to preserve their immortality, rather than their lives, become a comprehensible strategy.
VII. EGYPTIAN CASE STUDY
A look at the rise of suicide terrorism in Egypt provides initial realworld support for the proposed relationship between suicide attacks and
the disruptive influence of Western market values upon traditional societies.

125. In this light, suicide terrorism may also be viewed as a form of culture-bound syndrome,
like latah, and koro, but especially Malay amok, a form of “sudden mass assault.” See THE
CULTURE-BOUND SYNDROMES: FOLK ILLNESSES OF PSYCHIATRIC AND ANTHROPOLOGICAL
INTEREST (Ronald C. Simons & Charles C. Hughes eds., 1985).
126. Claude H. Miller & Mark J. Landau, Communication and Terrorism: A Terror Management Theory Perspective, 22 COMMC’N RSCH. REPS. 79, 82 (2005).
127. Jeff Greenberg et al., Terror Management Theory of Self-Esteem and Cultural
Worldviews: Empirical Assessments and Conceptual Refinements, 29 ADVANCES IN
EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCH. 61, 70 (1997), https://doi.org/10.1016/S0065-2601(08)60016-7.
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Table 1 shows that while Egypt has had an extensive history of terrorist attacks, the first use of suicide terrorism did not occur until 1993.
In contrast, Lebanon experienced suicide attacks beginning in at least
1981. As argued, that twelve-year lag suggests that technological innovation is not the spark that drives the method’s appearance. An alternative
explanation emerges from the observation that in both cases, the terrorist
attacks can be correlated with total imported goods into the country from
the United States.
Table 2 presents the correlation of terrorist attacks with imported
commodities in both countries. All tables and graphs in this Part are
drawn from the START data recorded in Table 1, compared with country
trade statistics taken from the International Trade Centre’s tables covering 2001-2019.128 The results show uneven support for this theory. In
Egypt, the chosen test case, suicide attacks have weaker correlations with
imports of United States’ commodities than does non-suicide terrorism,
contrary to expectations. The Lebanon results are similarly unimpressive:
although both relationships are weak, the suicides are slightly behind general terrorist attacks.
Table 2: Total US Imports x Terrorist Attacks
2001

2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

EGYPT
Total US Imports
Suicide Att.
Non-Suicide
LEBANON
Total US Imports
Suicide Att.
Non-Suicide

1,832,166

1,684,285

1,272,951

1,351,227

1,769,758

1,603,710

0
0
515,957

0
0
466,043

0
0
432,306

3
0
554,268

2
0
548,532

0
5
1,038,611

0
5

0
8

0
5

0
1

0
17

1
7

2007

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

EGYPT
Total US Imports
Suicide Att.
Non-Suicide
LEBANON
Total US Imports
Suicide Att.
Non-Suicide

2,571,843

5,673,135

4,744,216

4,961,898

6,470,100

5,276,494

0
0
1,140,911

0
1
1,848,558

0
2
1,770,103

0
2
1,919,314

2
16
1,994,558

0
49
2,375,536

1
17

1
57

0
14

0
5

0
10

0
15

2013

2014

2015

2016

2017

r

EGYPT
Total US Imports
Suicide Att.
Non-Suicide
LEBANON
Total US Imports

5,214,723

5,198,838

4,378,825

3,095,178

3,896,808

9
312
1,500,404

5
349
1,226,783

16
631
1,024,379

9
367
1,184,073

16
208
1,048,133

.20
.29

128. International Trade in Goods – Imports 2001-2019, INT’L TRADE CTR., http://www.intracen.org/itc/market-info-tools/statistics-import-product-country/ (last visited Nov. 14, 2020).
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Suicide Att.
Non-Suicide

6
115

13
191

4
40

2
39

29
2
21

.04
.15

The proposal, however, does not describe a one-to-one relationship
between marketing and suicidal terrorism such that imports influence attitudes and spur attacks all in the same year. While cultural shocks that
lead to such immediate effects are possible, the more likely progression
will be a sequence of influences from commodity introduction and advertising to perceived weakening of local norms, culminating in an existential crisis that triggers the possibility of suicidal defense. In other words,
the model locates the cause for suicide attacks not in contemporaneous
foreign imports, but as flowing from the repercussion of earlier imports.
To test this possibility, the import data was projected forward for
each of ten years to see what pattern emerged. Table 3 summarizes the
way time-shifting the trade data impacts correlations with attacks. This
relationship for Egypt is visually represented in Graph 1.
1
0.8
0.6
0.4
0.2
0
-0.2
-0.4

n

n-1

n-2

n-3

n-4

n-5

Suicide Attacks

n-6

n-7

n-8

n-9 n-10

NonSuicides

Graph 1: Time-Shifted Imports x Attacks Correlations (Egypt)

Table 3: Time-Shifted Imports x Terrorist Attacks Correlations
EGYPT
Suicide
Non-Suicide
LEBANON
Suicide
Non-Suicide
EGYPT
Suicide
Non-Suicide
LEBANON
Suicide

N
0.20
0.29
N
0.08
0.15
N
0.20
0.29
N
0.08

N-1
0.26
0.47
N-1
0.29
0.37
N-6
0.83
0.74
N-6
0.57

N-2
0.52
0.64
N-2
0.59
0.62
N-7
0.87
0.77
N-7
0.34

N-3
0.62
0.07
N-3
0.54
0.48
N-8
0.62
0.38
N-8
0.19

N-4
0.76
0.83
N-4
0.51
0.44
N-9
0.57
-0.01
N-9
-0.1

N-5
0.84
0.85
N-5
0.52
0.41
N-10
0.46
-0.21
N-10
-0.22
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Non-Suicide

0.15

0.42

0.16

0.08

[Vol. 44:1
-0.22

-0.3

As applied to Egypt, the model performs well. The correlation favors both general and suicide terrorism for the first five years after a market disruption. Thereafter, the relationship with general terrorism begins
to fall to the extent that by ten years later, the correlation is negative. The
rate of suicide attacks, however, continues to rise. Although the rate has
decreased in later years, it remains well above both the correlation for
general terrorism and initial values towards the end of the examined term.
This is the pattern one would anticipate if the resort to suicide attacks
comes after an extended process of weakening and dissatisfaction with
the effectiveness of the traditional immortality projects.129
For comparison, Graph 2 shows the same relationships for Lebanon.
Again, general terrorist attacks display a slightly better relationship with
American imports than do suicide attacks; however, two years later the
types of attacks cross over and suicide attacks remain more correlated
with imports for the next four years. After the sixth year, both forms of
attacks decrease. By the end of the sequence, although both correlations
are negative, suicide attacks remain above general attacks.130
1
0.5
0
-0.5

n

n-1 n-2 n-3 n-4 n-5 n-6 n-7 n-8 n-9 n-10
Suicide Attacks

NonSuicides

Graph 2: Time-Shifted Imports x Attacks Correlations (Lebanon)

The broad conclusion from this comparison is that to the extent that
the posited relationship exerts an influence on the incidence of suicide
terrorism, it varies for each country. According to the graphs, the introduction of suicide attacks into Egyptian conflicts is linked not to market
forces in 1993, but instead the market conflicts of 1986. In contrast, in
129. Although the current initial investigation treats trade data as a single isolated point, further
refinements would account for trade as an ongoing additive social input over several years.
130. On a broad methodological note, future investigations, rather than comparing total U.S.
imports, should consider that the predicted relationship holds mainly in categories containing luxury goods that reflect status and self-esteem rather than life necessities. For example, description
of the problem suggests that items of personal significance such as clothing and toiletries risk a
more disruptive cultural influence than imports of basic foodstuffs like grains.
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Lebanon, market changes in the mid-1970s would lead to the comparatively early use of suicide attacks.131
The overall feasibility of the model receives additional support from
an independent perspective: the subjective perceptions of Egyptians as
reported in ethnographies. From these descriptions we learn that new consumer patterns have significantly impacted the lives of ordinary Egyptians, and largely for the worse. Samuli Schielke, working among rural,
lower middle class men in villages in northern Egypt, recognized that
over the past decades “sustained economical growth [has] filled the cities’ streets . . . with private cars and new red-brick buildings of up to six
floors [having] transformed the appearance of villages.”132 Unfortunately,
this material bounty has exacted a steep price. Objectively, Egyptians appear to be better off; yet amidst this prosperity “almost everyone bitterly
complained about increasing economic pressure, corruption and nepotism, and deepening social divisions.”133
The difficulties associated with marriage illustrate this tension between the economic advantages from the new capitalism and the increased psychological pressures. “One of the greatest paradoxes of life in
contemporary Egypt is that in a society where marriage is considered a
self-evident, destiny-like necessity, it has become increasingly difficult
to get married. The primary reason for that difficulty is the rising cost of
marriage.”134 Indeed, anthropologist Farha Ghannam in her writings
about her work with a low-income neighborhood in Cairo states that,
“[G]etting married has become more and more challenging,” leading to a
“marriage crisis” in Egypt.135
At first glance, this may not strike the Western reader as a unique
problem. The costs of weddings have risen significantly in most societies,

131. Accessible longitudinal economic data from Lebanon from available sources such as the
World Bank and the official Lebanon Central Administration of Statistics do not report data earlier
than the mid-1980s, so it has not been possible to pursue this suggestion further.
132. SCHIELKE, supra note 100, at 154-55.
133. Id. at 155.
134. Id. at 112.
135. FARNA GHANNAM, LIVE AND DIE LIKE A MAN: GENDER DYNAMICS IN URBAN EGYPT
72 (2013). Id. at 80 (“This change has been shaped by global flows of information, images, and
products, and the increasing emphasis on consumption and its role in daily life in general and the
management of the body in particular.”). See also SCHIELKE, supra note 100, at 114 (“[B]ecause
people consider marriage a singularly important form of social becoming, and because of the availability of more and more consumer goods, better housing conditions, and the income and/or credit
to finance them, the cost of marriage is constantly magnified, to the degree that people can barely
afford it and so end up waiting much longer than previously was common to get married.”).
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with the average cost in the United States approaching $34,000.136 However, the real difficulty arises from the compulsory nature of these expenses. The problem, as Schielke’s informants describe, is that “while
most Egyptians can now buy many more things than they could twenty
or fifty years ago, buying those things is not something one can choose
to do in most cases, they are things one must buy, even if they may seem
a dispensable luxury to an outsider . . . [C]onsumption is not a choice. It
is a necessity.”137 The marriage suitor is expected to have accumulated a
significant list of goods, while the standard of what is deemed acceptable
by the woman’s family is continuously rising. Consequently,
the existential comfort of having a little more than one needs has
transformed into something more peculiar: an anxious combination of pressure and aspiration to realize a constantly better life
by accumulating more wealth . . . . [M]any among those people
do not experience growth as a comforting margin of surplus. Instead, they experience it as pressing scarcity . . . .138
This social pressure to consume has been accompanied by new
forms of advertising to hawk those wares and to create the perceived
needs. For example, a Turkish report states that,
[o]ne prominent material consumer object that has played a major role in the transformation of modern Turkey identity is the
diamond solitaire engagement ring. Formerly a status symbol of
the wealthy, the solitaire now, thanks to a massive media campaign by DeBeers’ Diamond Trading Company (DTC) and the
2006 song “Pirlanta” (“Diamond”) by Turkish pop singer Nil
Karaibrahimgil, has been embraced by the new emerging middle class, and as a result, can be found in every mall jewelry
shop.139
One survey found that “almost 82% [of survey takers] . . .
acknowledge that print ads are currently much more focused on sex”
which offended most Egyptian respondents, but were deemed inoffensive

136. Anna Hecht, Here’s How Much the Average Wedding Cost in 2019, CNBC (Feb. 14, 2020,
11:01 AM), https://www.cnbc.com/2020/02/13/how-much-the-average-wedding-cost-in-2019.
html.
137. SCHIELKE, supra note 100, at 115.
138. Id. at 119.
139. Tanfer Emin Tunç, Between East and West: Consumer Culture and Identity Negotiation
in Contemporary Turkey, in MUSLIM SOCIETIES IN THE AGE OF MASS CONSUMPTION: POLITICS,
CULTURE AND IDENTITY BETWEEN THE LOCAL AND THE GLOBAL 73, 78-79 (Johanna Pink ed.,
2009).
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by most non-Egyptians.140 In other words, while the rise of consumer expectations is inherently anxiety-provoking, the baseline pressures are exacerbated by the accompanying ancillary services that support that market economy. Commercials “overwhelmingly feature blond Egyptians
(and often blond foreigners with Egyptian voice-over), racy clothes, and
a generally Western-oriented attitude,”141 which stir up further discomfort
in local societies.
The negative effects of consumer capitalism are not completely inevitable. The narrative should not be framed as a necessary clash between
Western values and Middle Eastern traditions. Societies and individuals
are equipped to make the transition as best one can. For example, Johanna
Pink collected essays describing largely unproblematic incorporation of
consumer values in a range of Muslim societies.142 To “interpret Egyptian
popular culture either as a straightforward imitation of the West or, conversely, as cryptic resistance to hegemonic power, would as often as not
lead one to misunderstand the character of the art.”143 Instead of a conflict
of cultures, Egyptians “aspire to make global modernity their own, without becoming homogenized or fully connected in the sense evoked by
globalization.”144 Although the effort at syncretism can itself be problematic,145 the immediate lesson here is that the process is challenging. Even
if the process is largely successful across a population, a significant minority may feel so alienated as to seek a different path to resolution. The
fuller development of the present model would operationalize the size of
the excluded population and the force and abruptness of the market insertions to capture the variability of incidents of suicide terrorism by civilians.
The impact of these influences can strike deeply into the psyche of
that population, complicating already tenuous developmental processes.
For example, the “growing emphasis on consumption” has impacted the
structure of men’s self-identity.146 However, the means to achieve this
recognized adult status can often compel individuals “to make
140. CHRISTINE SAMY, STEREOTYPING AND SEXISM IN ADVERTISING: AN EMPHASIS ON THE
PORTRAYAL OF WOMEN IN EGYPT 32, 50 (2016).
141. WALTER ARMBURST, MASS CULTURE AND MODERNISM IN EGYPT 131 (1996).
142. See generally MUSLIM SOCIETIES IN THE AGE OF MASS CONSUMPTION: POLITICS,
CULTURE AND IDENTITY BETWEEN THE LOCAL AND THE GLOBAL (Johanna Pink ed., 2009).
143. ARMBURST, supra note 141, at 3.
144. SCHIELKE, supra note 100, at 153.
145. See e.g., id. at 20 (focusing on the nexus of capitalist consumption and revivalist ethics,
[Carla] Jones argues that “while pious fashion promises a solution to the troublesome and contradictory demands of virtue and fashion, it is a tragic attempt, because pious consumption actually
reproduces precisely those anxieties about vanity and virtue that it promises to alleviate”).
146. GHANNAM, supra note 135, at 71.
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compromises that potentially undermined his view of himself as a man in
order to satisfy the requests of others that were essential to socially producing him as a man.”147 To acquire the external markers of manhood—
which are largely procured in the marketplace—it can be necessary to
breach the values that constitute the internal achievements of manhood.
In sum, there seem to be few ways for the ordinary person to succeed at
the common goals of life in this new, consumer-oriented society without
paying a high psychological toll.
Many informants report being overwhelmed by these forces, leading
to a state of anxiety that Schielke’s sources describe as feeling “bored,”
a term drawing upon the world-weariness associated with the related condition of ennui. Boredom, perhaps paradoxically, “came to the village
hand in hand with education, mass media, and mobility,”148 or the kinds
of developments that might be expected to lead to new, exciting opportunities. Instead, boredom “is more an existential state of lacking of future
and hope, which is intimately coupled with frustration and often close to
despair.”149 In keeping with the existential philosophers in the West,
Egyptians believe that the “solution to boredom is doing something
meaningful.”150
As previously described, a wide range of cultural solutions responds
to the need to find meaning in a life experienced as pointless and unfulfilling. Indeed, anything at all can serve the purpose, so long as it is assigned the role of “ultimate concern” in the individual’s psychology.151
But without question, the institution specifically tailored to this task is
religion: “[r]eligious armor allows one to cope with life’s disappointments in an unknown, modern, pluralistic world, when everyday control
is removed, and thus supra-human power is required.”152 Both of these
generalizations are found in the reasons given to account for one of
Schielke’s informant’s turn toward Salafi fundamentalism as following
upon an urgent personal crisis experienced as a moral vacuum. In
147. Id. at 94.
148. SCHIELKE, supra note 100, at 34.
149. Id. at 32.
150. Id. at 46.
151. James Michael Donovan, Defining Religion: Death and Anxiety in an Afro-Brazilian Cult
105-106 (1994) (Ph.D. dissertation, Tulane University); see also James Michael Donovan, Defining
Religion, in SELECTED READINGS IN THE ANTHROPOLOGY OF RELIGION: THEORETICAL AND
METHODOLOGICAL ESSAYS 61, 87 (Stephen D. Glazier & Charles A. Flowerday, eds., 2003).
152. Ragnar K. Willer, The Re-Spiritualization of Consumption or the Commercialization of
Religion: Creativity, Responsibility, and Hope: The Case of Sunsilk Clean and Fresh in Indonesia,
in Contemporary Turkey, in MUSLIM SOCIETIES IN THE AGE OF MASS CONSUMPTION: POLITICS,
CULTURE AND IDENTITY BETWEEN THE LOCAL AND THE GLOBAL 281, 290 (Johanna Pink ed.,
2009).
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Mustafa’s words, it was a matter of urgently wanting to be able to “know
right from wrong.”153 Interestingly, Mustafa’s later military service
served the same purpose, “[t]he military service kept him busy, and in a
peculiar fashion it offered him something of the same thing he had been
searching for in Salafism.” Mustafa stated, “I feel at peace because everything has a clear structure, you don’t have to think for yourself.”154
Having experienced the anxiety-provoking effects of living in a consumer-oriented society, people seeking a better solution, such as Mustafa,
often seek out religion.155 For many, this newfound immersion in religious orthodoxy has been effective. Among Schielke’s informants, those
involved in religion claimed to have found a way to avoid the pitfalls of
“boredom”: “[w]e as Muslims do not feel so much boredom because
when you pray regularly, it gives you hope again every time.”156
Consequently, “[a]mong the Muslim majority of the population, an
Islamic revival has made a scripturally-oriented and conservative sense
of religiosity the most powerful source of moral certainty and existential
hope.”157 However, the decision to rely on religious belief to serve this
psychological role creates its own secondary anxieties that lead to “the
cultivation of an anxious vigilance toward anything that could relativize
the certainty of religion as an absolute truth about all interpretation, negotiation, and reconciliation.”158 Religious commitment in this environment takes the form of “a double move of emphatic attachment to a shared
ground of truth and certainty, and a heightened anxiety and sensitivity
toward those who do not share that firm ground.”159
While Westerners might rely upon compartmentalization to avoid
the full thrust of the cognitive dissonance between conflicting values,160
many Egyptians find that approach unsustainable:
It might seem as if different worlds stood here side by side: the
world of Islam as a regime of divine protection, order, and justice; the world of global capitalism with its investment in financial schemes; the world of commercial media with its reliance
on consumerism, advertisement, and desire; the world of
153. SCHIELKE, supra note 100, at 131.
154. Id. at 131-32.
155. WALTER ARMBURST, MARTYRS AND TRICKSTERS: AN ETHNOGRAPHY OF THE EGYPTIAN
REVOLUTION 151 (2019) (quoting Hasanayn ‘Abd al-Rahman).
156. SCHIELKE, supra note 100, at 44 (quoting Hilmi, an informant).
157. Id. at 3.
158. Id. at 79-80.
159. Id. at 15.
160. David Berliner, Anthropology as the Study of Contradictions, 6 HAU: J. ETHNOGRAPHIC
THEORY 1, 2-3 (2016).
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romantic love with its celebration of passion. But these are not
different worlds. They are constituents, parts, of people’s lifeworlds—lifeworlds that can never be explained by any single
principle but that must be understood in their complexity and
openness, in their many hopes and frustrations.161
The result for some Egyptians is that, in order to avoid a breakthrough of the contrary examples of personal meaning, the threat of existential anxiety can lead to defensive reactions against the new values.
Closing the argument, we finally learn that “[p]eople often also see boredom and depression as related phenomena, and in one occasion people I
talked with also associated boredom with the issue of suicide.”162
Suicide for Egyptians, according to Ghannam, is not necessarily the
manifestation of a sickly attitude toward life, as it is for Westerners, but
can instead be a path to the valued “good ending”:
One may be tempted to understand the Egyptian notion of good
ending as a negation of life, a sign of fatalism and irrationality,
a call for people to value only the afterlife and ignore the current
one. As argued by Charles Hirschkind, for “many in the West
today, Muslim discourses on death are taken as evidence of a
diseased culture, one frequently epitomized in the figure of the
suicide bomber.” Yet this simplistic and hasty conclusion does
not capture how the notion of good death establishes a strong
relationship between this life and the afterlife, between one’s religious devotion and engagement with the community, and between one’s deeds and intentions . . . . [R]ather than a sign of
fatalism, the notion of good death is a sign of realism. Instead of
denying death, distancing it from the self, and turning it into a
taboo that should be hidden, the meaning of the good ending
highlights the fact that no one can escape death and offers ways
to manage this biological, social, and religious fact . . . . [T]he
notion of good death in fact encourages a deep ethical and practical engagement in the life of one’s family and community.”163
Having begun with the increased consumerism within Egyptian society, the ethnographic narrative traces how the ramifications of those
changes can lead many to experience “boredom” as a result of new insecurities arising from economic pressures, which in turn influences a small
portion of these individuals to consider suicide as an appropriate manner
to resolve these contradictions with a “good ending.” This approach may
161. SCHIELKE, supra note 100, at 12.
162. Id. at 32.
163. GHANNAM, supra note 135, at 159.
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combine with a renewed religious commitment in order to remedy the
existential vacuum created by reliance on the inferior and contradictory
consumer-driven values. The two pressures can converge, mutually reinforcing one another into a lack of tolerance for contradictory views. This
concatenation of influences may be comparatively rare, but when they
occur the result can be literally explosive.
VIII. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
Terrorism, while a problem, is not a mystery. The motivations of
actors to resort to nonconventional military methods to press their interests are not conceptually dissimilar to the strategies of soldiers on more
traditional battlefields. However differently the law may treat the actions,
the individual psychologies that motivate the violence employ the same
elements, albeit to different effects.
The same cannot be said about suicide terrorism; for otherwise mentally healthy individuals to commit to schemes that require their own
deaths bewilders, even frightens most onlookers. While some subsume
this behavior as a special case of general terrorism—meaning that the
same explanatory variables for the latter will apply also to the former—
the best available evidence contradicts this interpretative stance. Rather,
suicide terrorism in most cases appears to be a sui generis phenomenon
needing its own explanation.
The present discussion attempts to provide the missing explanation
by employing TMT, which describes how we seek to dispel death anxiety
through meanings assigned by cultural symbols. The rise of suicide terrorism can then be accounted for as the outcome of undermining those
cultural solutions with competing inferior solutions, in this case consumer capitalism. The TMT perspective promises to encompass a wider
range of related phenomena than other competing approaches. While this
discussion has focused on one example by providing an account for the
differential resort to suicide terrorism, other problems could be similarly
explained, such as the lone wolf terrorist.
Suicide terrorism, though, is a complex behavior, and while the
available evidence offers initial support for this narrative, it is unlikely to
be a complete explanation at the level of particulars. Granting that suicidism springs from existential variables, not all irruptions of these difficulties will be traced back to economic conditions. Some instances will
continue to be better explained by political or other social dimensions. In
this sense, Pape’s analysis that suicide terrorism is primarily about U.S.
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military insertions continues to serve as an intelligible proximate cause.164
We get a glimpse of the existence of these alternatives when looking
again at Table 1. Israel, for example, cannot be easily described as having
experienced an insertion of new and alien capitalist markets. It is therefore unsurprising that despite its recurring experience with suicide attacks, the relationship between START counts for suicide attacks and
ITC trade data does not follow the pattern described, as can be seen in
Graph 3.
1
0.5
0
-0.5

n

n-1

n-2

n-3

n-4

n-5

n-6

n-7

n-8

n-9 n-10

-1
Suicide Attacks

NonSuicides

Graph 3: Time-Shifted Imports x Attacks Correlations (Israel)

The need for a different approach such as the one offered here has
arisen because the political model also does not fully account for the pattern of suicide incidents. The TMT-grounded model presented here
serves as the shared ultimate cause, the preservation of cultural significance-defining institutions, explaining why many would find self-annihilation in defense of the idea of a country (like Palestine) attractive, while
not requiring that overt political views are the sine qua non of suicide
attacks.
What, then, can be done to respond to the ongoing threat of suicide
terrorism attacks? An Obama Department of State official was heavily
ridiculed for suggesting that instead of striving to bomb jihadists out of
existence, we needed to address the root causes by giving them jobs.165
Despite the mockery, this approach makes sense because if money has
become the new immortality project, we must offer the means for people

164. See PAPE, supra note 28, at 23; Akhtar Ali Syed, Recent Trends in Suicide Attacks, 8 PAK.
J. SOC. CLIN. PSYCH. 73, 85 (2010).
165. Joshua Keating, Conservatives Are Blasting the Obama Administration for Saying Unemployment Causes Terrorism. They’re Kind of Right, (Feb. 18, 2015, 1:38 PM),
https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2015/02/conservatives-are-blasting-the-obama-administration-for-saying-unemployment-causes-terrorism-theyre-kind-of-right.html.

FINAL_FOR_JCI

2021]

8/3/21 4:45 PM

Theories Grounding Suicide Terrorism

39

to earn income so that they feel that their immortality goals are achievable:
We see the pattern over and over . . . . [I]f you have prosperity,
something that gives them work and opportunity, you address
the communities’ main vulnerability. If the livelihoods are
strong enough, they get a community that is strong enough to
band together again when they face a threat.166
In an ideal world, the response to suicide terrorism would be to scale
back capitalistic incursions into cultural environments where they would
be alien and disruptive influences, and to require that marketers conform
not to the values of the Western-identified elites, but to those of the ordinary folk. This point is especially true regarding any accompanying advertisements that preach a foreign need for those new items.
Since such a humane policy of globalized economics is unlikely,
and in any event the damage has already been done, the most likely outcome is two-fold. First, reports exist of programs to “deradicalize” insurgents when offered the kind of job training and economic support that the
theory expects should make a difference.167 However, this approach is not
easily scalable. While these efforts describe successes, they require individual treatment that is not commensurate with the scope of the problem.
Even without such interventions, the second long-term prospect is
that suicide terrorism—or at least the percentage of it that has its roots in
economic variables—is likely to gradually age out of the world stage as
the culture shock initiated by aggressive capitalistic marketing becomes
the “new normal.” We are perhaps already seeing the beginning of this
development: a recent overview found that while absolute numbers are
on the rise, relative to general terrorism, suicide attacks are not increasing,168 and may even be noticeably decreasing.169 A final look at the pattern of incidents in Table 1 conveys the impression that after the appearance of suicide attacks, incidents reach a peak and then begin to cycle
down. For example, while Sri Lanka continues to experience attacks of
general terrorism, it has seen no suicide attacks since 2010.
166. GRAEME WOOD, THE WAY OF STRANGERS: ENCOUNTERS WITH THE ISLAMIC STATE 273
(2017) (quoting Justin Richmond).
167. Arie W. Kruglanski et al., Terrorism – a (Self) Love Story: Redirecting the Significance
Quest Can End Violence, 68 AM. PSYCH. 559, 559-575 (2013); Arie W. Kruglanski et al., Significance Quest Theory as the Driver of Radicalization Towards Terrorism, in RESILIENCE AND
RESOLVE: COMMUNITIES AGAINST TERRORISM 27, 27-28 (Jolene Jerard & Salim Mohamed Nasir
eds., 2015).
168. Dechesne & Brandt-Law, supra note 25, at 144.
169. Global Terrorism Index 2019: Measuring the Impact of Terrorism, INST. FOR ECON. &
PEACE 64 (2019).
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Given that the world has become more chaotic, theories that ground
terrorism and suicide terrorism in political resistance probably would not
predict the decline in suicidism we are presently observing. Civilians will
no doubt become more dissatisfied as they grow accustomed to the replacement of local values, and will begin to report the levels of mental
illness common to Americans. They will, however, grow to view the prevailing mindset as just the way things are, and concentrate on working to
find their place within the new order rather than seeking to push it back
through violent opposition to restore an earlier system.
Regardless of how the question of suicide attacks develops, we may
conclude on the observation that, according to the perspective defended
here, the problem arose at least in part because the major powers have
been myopic regarding the value of alternative ways of living. The West
has appeared to commit itself to the proposition that material advancement is not simply useful, but represents the highest moral good. This
belief has led the West to expect that others should share that priority,
even when it is unlikely they will all ever be able to enjoy the same benefits.170 Yet given that many societies do not share the American view of
the independent self, cultural insults that a Westerner might shrug off because of an individualist focus might be devastating to someone with an
interdependent concept of self.171
There is nothing natural or inevitable in the cultural primacy of material acquisition, and many societies have structured for themselves different symbolic resources to assign meaning and significance to thereby
dissolve the death paradox. Global actors need to be more sensitive to
how these alternative ways of living are impacted by foreign marketing
and economic insertions. These intrusions need to be tied to the existing
symbols and lifeways, over time.172 As Eric Hoffer observed a generation
ago,
[e]ven when a colonial power is wholly philanthropic and its
sole aim is to bring prosperity and progress to a . . . people, it
must do all it can to preserve and reinforce the corporate pattern.
It must not concentrate on the individual but inject the

170. Charlotte McDaniel, How Many Earths Do We Need?, BBC NEWS (June 16, 2015),
https://www.bbc.com/news/magazine-33133712.
171. Hazel Rose Markus & Shinobu Kitayama, Culture and the Self: Implications for Cognition, Emotion, and Motivation, 98 PSYCH. REV. 224 (1991).
172. Fathali M. Moghaddam, The Staircase to Terrorism: A Psychological Exploration, AM.
PSYCH. 161, 167 (2005).
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innovations and reforms into tribal or communal channels and
let the tribe or the community progress as a whole.173
If the spread of capitalism is, as some claim, inevitable, we have a
duty, or if nothing else a self-serving interest, to assure that this transition
occurs in a way that minimizes ideological disruption and thus violent,
yet predictable, blowback.

173. HOFFER, supra note 34, at 39.

